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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal involves a dispute over attorney's fees 
awarded in a suit brought under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination ("LAD"). Phillip Lanni prevailed below, but 
argues on appeal that the District Court erred in its 
calculation of his attorney's fees. Lanni also takes issue 
with the District Court's order quashing a writ of execution 
against the State of New Jersey. 
 
I. 
 
Phillip Lanni has a number of learning disabilities that 
inhibit his ability to solve problems and to process and 
understand spoken and written language. Lanni was 
employed, beginning in October of 1990, by the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection ("the DEP"). 
Beginning in 1991, Lanni worked as a radio dispatcher at 
the DEP. Lanni claims that, during his employment in this 
capacity, supervisors and co-employees made him the butt 
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of jokes, verbally abused him, and mistreated him because 
of his disabilities. 
 
In 1995, Lanni signed a contract with Linda Wong of the 
law firm Wong Fleming, P.C., procuring her representation 
in an action against the DEP. Lanni agreed that, if he 
entered into litigation, he would maintain a "partial 
contingency fee arrangement" with Wong Fleming under 
which he would pay "the greater of: (1) $125 dollars 
multiplied by the amount of hours expended on [the] case, 
(2) a fee awarded by a Court, or (3) a contingency fee 
including any attorneys fees already paid."  The agreement 
also provided that, in the alternative, Lanni had the right to 
pay Wong Fleming "the reasonable value of [its] services" 
which it placed at "an hourly rate of $175 per hour" for the 
services of Linda Wong and "an equal or lower billable rate" 
for the services of the other members and employees of the 
firm. 
 
In 1996, Wong Fleming represented Lanni by filing a ten- 
count complaint against the DEP and nine defendants 
employed there. The complaint alleged disability 
discrimination, a hostile workplace, a failure to 
accommodate, retaliation, and various other claims under 
the ADA, the LAD, the Conscientious Employee Protection 
Act, and the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. In October, 1997, 
the District Court dismissed the majority of these claims on 
summary judgment, leaving only one count against three 
individual defendants and the DEP. 
 
The case was tried during the months of December, 
1998, and January, 1999 by Ms. Wong and Daniel Fleming, 
the named partners of Wong Fleming. After nineteen days 
of testimony, the jury returned a verdict finding violations 
of the ADA and LAD by two defendants and the DEP and 
finding no liability on the part of the third individual 
defendant. Lanni was awarded $70,930.00 in economic 
damages and $156,100.00 in non-economic damages. No 
punitive damages were assessed. 
 
Pursuant to the ADA and the LAD, Lanni was permitted 
to recover reasonable attorney's fees as a result of 
prevailing in his law suit. Six months after the verdict, 
Lanni filed an application that claimed his lawyers were 
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entitled to $1,165,444.88 in attorney's fees and $49,412.75 
in costs, for a total fee of $1,214,857.63. Six months later, 
following hearings and the submission of briefs on the issue 
of fees, the District Court awarded Lanni $277,723.50 in 
fees and $24,706.00 in costs. The correctness of the 
process by which the District Court calculated this award 
is the primary matter disputed. 
 
II. 
 
We review the District Court's decision to award 
attorney's fees under an abuse of discretion standard. See 
Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1982) ("We 
can find an abuse of discretion if no reasonable man would 
adopt the district court's view."). Whether the correct 
standards were applied by the District Court in determining 
the allowable fee is a question of law subject to plenary 
review. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d 
Cir. 1990). The District Court's factual findings will be 
disturbed only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 1182-83. 
 
As the prevailing party on an ADA claim, Lanni is 
permitted to recover an award of attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. 
S 12205 ("the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow 
the prevailing party [in a discrimination case] . . . a 
reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and 
costs . . ."). The LAD has a similar provision. N.J.S.A. 10:5- 
27.1 ("the prevailing party may be awarded a reasonable 
attorney's fee. . ."). 
 
The jury's damage award in this case was made under 
both the ADA and LAD. Accordingly, to the extent the 
applicable standards for an award of attorney's fees and 
costs differ under the two statutes and an appropriate 
award under one exceeds an appropriate award under the 
other, Lanni is entitled to elect to receive the higher award. 
As we discuss hereafter, an award under the LAD may 
reflect any risk of nonpayment of a fee assumed by counsel. 
An award under the ADA may not reflect that risk. In other 
respects, the ADA and LAD law applicable here does not 
materially differ. 
 
Under both ADA and LAD law, a "lodestar" amount 
provides the starting point for determining reasonable 
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attorney's fees. See Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183. The lodestar is 
obtained by multiplying the number of hours reasonably 
expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. See 
id. A District Court has substantial discretion in 
determining what constitutes a reasonable rate and 
reasonable hours, but once the lodestar is determined, it is 
presumed to be the reasonable fee. See id. Following a 
determination of the lodestar, either party may seek 
adjustment. If that party meets the burden of proving that 
an adjustment is appropriate, the lodestar amount may be 
increased or reduced at the discretion of the District Court. 
See id. 
 
Wong Fleming utilized an electronic billing system that 
tracked time spent by each employee of the firm to the 
tenth of an hour. Both Ms. Wong and Mr. Fleming alleged 
that they currently charge $325 an hour for their services. 
Wong Fleming asserted that its associates were due fees in 
the $180 an hour range (depending upon experience), while 
its paralegals and other firm staff were due payment at a 
lesser rate, but not below $70 an hour. Multiplying these 
rates by the hours recorded in their billing system, Wong 
Fleming calculated its lodestar. Wong Fleming then argued 
that a multiplier of 75% was warranted in this case due to 
the substantially contingent nature of the compensation 
structure and the legal risk associated with taking the case. 
In this way, Wong Fleming arrived at its total requested 
attorney's fees of $1,165,444.88. Costs and expenses were 
claimed at $49,412.75. 
 
While accepting that Lanni, as a prevailing party, was 
entitled to his reasonable attorney's fees, the District Court 
did not accept Wong Fleming's calculations. Lanni raises 
five challenges to the District Court's decision regarding 
costs and fees. 
 
A. 
 
First, Lanni contends that the District Court erred in its 
determination of reasonable hourly market rates for Wong 
Fleming's services. The District Court rejected Wong 
Fleming's asserted rate of $325 an hour for Linda Wong 
and Daniel Fleming. The District Court instead concluded 
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that the reasonable hourly rates of Wong and Fleming 
should be calculated on a graduated scale, varying 
according to the time period during which the services were 
performed. 
 
The party seeking fees bears the burden of producing 
sufficient evidence of what constitutes a reasonable market 
rate for the essential character and complexity of the legal 
services rendered in order to make out a prima facie case. 
Smith v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 107 F.3d 223, 225 (3d 
Cir. 1997). If the prima facie case has been made, the 
opposing party bears the burden of producing record 
evidence that will contest this rate. Id. If reasonable market 
rates are in dispute, a hearing must be conducted. Id. 
 
When attorney's fees are awarded, the current market 
rate must be used. See Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183; Rendine v. 
Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1127 (N.J. 1995). The current 
market rate is the rate at the time of the fee petition, not 
the rate at the time the services were performed. See Rode, 
892 F.2d at 1188-89 (describing petition based on current 
rates as premised on a theory of "delay compensation") 
Rendine, 661 A.2d at 1127 (To take into account delay in 
payment, the hourly rate at which compensation is to be 
awarded should be based on current rates rather than 
those in effect when the services were performed."). 
 
The District Court was apparently well aware of these 
rules, and stated that it was using a "current market rate" 
to determine the proper attorney's fees due to appellant. It 
then inexplicably calculated the fees on a graduated scale 
roughly tracking the actual historic rates of Linda Wong.1 
The District Court observed that the "method of applying 
current rates is flexible within the discretion of the Court" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court arrived at the following partner rates for the 
following time periods: from November, 1995, to November, 1996, $175 
per hour; from December, 1996, to November, 1997, $185 per hour; 
from December, 1997, to November, 1998, $195 per hour; from 
December, 1998, to the present, $205 per hour. 
 
Though the earlier rates seem to roughly approximate Ms. Wong's 
historic rates as evidenced by the record, Ms. Wong's fee petition alleged 
her current rate during 1999 to be $325 per hour, $120 per hour above 
the rate awarded by the court. 
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and then concluded that calculating rates on a graduated 
scale would be "consistent with the rationale behind 
calculating a reasonable hourly rate" because it would 
"offset the costs of the delay in payment to plaintiff's 
counsel, while still avoiding a `windfall' to counsel beyond 
their reasonable rate." We are uncertain how the District 
Court believed its professed use of the current market rate 
could be harmonized with a graduated scale that awarded 
historic rates. A current market rate is exactly that -- a 
reasonable rate based on the currently prevailing rates in 
the community for comparable legal services. It is not a 
graduated schedule of past rates. We conclude that the 
District Court's use of an historical graduated scale to 
calculate a current market rate for partners at Wong 
Fleming was a misapplication of the appropriate legal 
standard. 
 
The District Court also concluded that Wong Fleming's 
alleged rates for associates and paralegals were 
unreasonable. The District Court stated that because the 
highest hourly rate it granted on its graduated scale for the 
named partners was $205 an hour, constituting 63% of 
Wong Fleming's alleged rate, Wong Fleming's asserted rates 
for associates and paralegals should be multiplied by 63% 
to arrive at a reasonable rate. This method of calculation 
seems less oriented towards making a proper determination 
of a reasonable current rate than towards punishing 
overreaching. Again, we conclude that the District Court 
failed to follow the applicable legal standards for the 
calculation of a current market rate. 
 
While we agree with the appellant that the testimony of 
appellee's expert contains very little in the way of probative 
"contradictory evidence" of currently prevailing market rates 
and agree that in some instances, a district court may be 
justified in awarding rates similar to those requested by 
Wong Fleming, see, e.g., Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 
2 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603-04 & n.5 (D.N.J. 1998) (awarding 
$300 per hour though noting that, under the facts of that 
case, such a rate was "suspect"), we conclude defendants 
met their burden of coming forward with sufficient other 
evidence to support a finding that the market rate in this 
situation was well below the rates claimed by Wong 
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Fleming. On remand, the District Court should determine 
the currently prevailing rates in the community for 
comparable legal services at the time the fee petition was 
filed. 
 
B. 
 
Second, Lanni claims the District Court erred when it 
found that the presence of both named partners of Wong 
Fleming at trial was excessive and determined that 
allowance of the claimed hours for the presence of a second 
partner would be unreasonable. The District Court 
accordingly disallowed the 138.7 hours spent by Mr. 
Fleming at trial. Wong Fleming asserts that this case was 
unusually challenging and novel and required the time of 
two attorneys. 
 
Rendine admonishes that "[t]rial courts should not accept 
passively the submission of counsel to support the lodestar 
amount. . . . For example, where three attorneys are 
present at a hearing when one would suffice, compensation 
should be denied for the excess time." Rendine, 661 A.2d at 
12264 (quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 
(D.C. Cir. 1980)). It is therefore clearly permissible as a 
general matter under the LAD for a court to find the 
presence of two named partners during a trial to constitute 
an excessive and unreasonable expenditure of hours. 
 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion. Given 
Wong's professed expertise in this area, it would have not 
been unreasonable to expect her to conduct the trial alone 
or with the help of an associate. While we believe awarding 
fees for Fleming's time multiplied by an associate's rate 
may have been justifiable here, it is not our role under an 
abuse of discretion standard to substitute our inclinations 
for those of the District Court. See In re Tutu Wells 
Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 387 (3d Cir. 1997) ("An 
abuse of discretion is a clear error of judgment, and not 
simply a different result which can arguably be obtained 
when applying the law to the facts of the case.") (citations 
and internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the District 
Court's disallowance of Fleming's trial time will stand. 
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C. 
 
Third, Lanni claims the District Court erred by deducting 
25% from the lodestar because Lanni did not prevail on all 
of his claims. The District Court's downward adjustment 
was made under the rubric of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424, 433-35 (1983), which teaches that where a 
plaintiff prevails on one or more claims but not on others, 
fees shall not be awarded for time that would not have been 
spent had the unsuccessful claims not been pursued. The 
Hensley Court termed this a downward adjustment for 
"limited success." Id. at 436-37. 
 
The District Court noted that only two of the original ten 
claims had succeeded and that only the DEP and two of the 
original nine individual defendants had been found liable. 
Wong Fleming has failed to persuade us that the time spent 
pursuing the unsuccessful claims contributed in any way 
to Lanni's success on his remaining claims. Accordingly, we 
find no abuse of discretion in connection with the Hensley 
reduction of the lodestar for limited success. 
 
D. 
 
Fourth, Lanni claims the District Court erred by denying 
its request for a multiplier enhancing the lodestar by 75% 
based on the risk of counsel's being inadequately 
compensated. The law of the ADA and LAD diverge on the 
question of the availability of multiplier enhancements for 
contingency of compensation. While there is no basis for 
such enhancements under the ADA, they are permissible 
under the LAD. Compare City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 
U.S. 557, 563 (1992) (finding, under a comparable federal 
fees provision that contingency fees would "amount[ ] to 
double counting") with Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d at1202 
(N.J. 1995) (rejecting Dague and approving of contingency 
enhancements under the LAD). 
 
Where plaintiffs have prevailed on LAD claims in federal 
court, we have approved of Rendine enhancements and 
required District Courts to consider their possible 
application. See Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 160 
& n.15 (3d Cir. 1998); Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 
1511 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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LAD cases have not required "pure" contingency in order 
to warrant an enhancement, but instead have awarded 
multipliers in cases where fees were "substantially" or 
"predominantly" contingent. Rendine, 661 A.2d at 1216-17. 
The agreement in this case was hardly a straightforward 
contingency arrangement. Lanni paid $32,000 to Wong 
Fleming during the course of the litigation and was 
required by contract to pay Wong Fleming a minimum of 
$125 per hour, whether he won or lost at trial. Lanni points 
out, however, that the $125 an hour rate was a reduced 
"partial contingency" rate below Wong Fleming's normal 
rate (which was $175 for Linda Wong, at least initially). 
Wong Fleming also represents that it took Lanni's case 
knowing that he was considering filing for bankruptcy in 
order to prevent a foreclosure on his home. 
 
The District Court stated: "The Court has considered 
plaintiff's entitlement to an enhancement under the LAD. 
While plaintiff's attorneys in this case were competent and 
the case was well argued, the Court concludes that 
counsel's performance does not warrant an enhancement in 
this case." Wong Fleming argues that the District Court 
misperceived the claim it was making. Wong Fleming 
makes no argument that Lanni is entitled to an 
enhancement based on the quality of its performance. 
Rather, it argues for a contingency enhancement under 
Rendine, 661 A.2d at 1228 ("We hold that the trial court, 
after having carefully established the amount of the 
lodestar fee, should consider whether to increase that fee to 
reflect the risk of nonpayment in all cases in which the 
attorney's compensation entirely or substantially is 
contingent on a successful outcome."). 
 
The District Court failed to address the Rendine  
argument. On remand, the District Court must consider 
whether this is a "substantially contingent" case under the 
Rendine analysis, and if so, whether a contingency 
enhancement is warranted. 
 
E. 
 
Fifth, Lanni contends that the District Court erred by 
reducing all of its costs by 50% based solely on the finding 
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that Wong Fleming had charged what the Court thought to 
be unreasonable rates for photocopies and faxes. Wong 
Fleming charged twenty-five cents per page for photocopies 
and a dollar per page for faxes. The defendants offered 
evidence tending to show that copies could be purchased 
for two to six cents per page and faxes should have cost 
closer to fifty cents per page. The District Court concluded 
that the costs and expenses requested by Wong Fleming 
were "excessive and extreme" and awarded only half the 
requested amount. 
 
Like Lanni, we read the District Court's opinion as 
offering the disparity between faxing and photocopying 
costs and the actual costs of those services as the sole 
justification for the Court's fifty percent reduction. We can 
understand the District Court's indignation at what it 
understandably perceived to be overreaching with respect 
to faxing and photocopying, and we acknowledge that 
district courts have broad discretion in the imposition of 
costs. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 
454 (3d Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, without more explanation 
than we have been given,2 we can only characterize the 
Court's fifty percent reduction as arbitrary. This is not a 
case in which the District Court has found a pattern of 
overreaching and has made a reasoned estimate of the 
overcharges. Here, we find ourselves simply unable to tell 
from whence the District Court's fifty percent figure came. 
On remand, the District Court will re-assess the costs and 
expenses. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The appellees offer an explanation which purports to justify the 
District Court's fifty percent solution. The District Court's opinion, 
however, bears little relation to the appellees' analysis. 
 
We believe the District Court was justifiably concerned that the fee 
application of over one million dollars was excessive and overreaching 
under the circumstances, as was the reimbursement sought for costs. 
However, while our jurisprudence affords great latitude to a District 
Court's decision on attorney's fees, it also constrains such decisions by 
requiring particularized findings or statements of reasons for significant 
reductions in costs and fees. 
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III. 
 
Also in dispute is a writ of execution, issued against the 
State of New Jersey seeking satisfaction of the fee award. 
The District Court entered judgment awarding quantified 
attorney's fees to Lanni on December 2, 1999. As we have 
noted, he appealed this judgment. In April of 2000, Wong 
Fleming had the United States Marshal serve on the 
Treasurer of the State of New Jersey a writ of execution 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 seeking satisfaction of the 
attorney's fees judgment.3 In May of 2000, the District 
Court granted a motion from the State of New Jersey to 
quash the writ of execution. Thereafter, on June 14, 2000, 
the appellees, believing that Wong Fleming might no longer 
be representing Lanni, moved for permission to deposit the 
amount of the fee judgment with the District Court. 4 This 
motion was granted, and the funds remain on deposit with 
the clerk. Lanni appeals the order quashing the writ of 
execution and also filed a motion seeking a writ of 
mandamus from this court to compel the District Court to 
vacate its order quashing the writ and to direct the District 
Court to transfer the lodged funds. We denied this motion 
on August 23, 2000. 
 
In its order granting the defendants' motion to quash the 
writ of execution, the District Court noted that interest was 
accruing on the fee judgment, that the defendants were 
"not in danger of becoming insolvent," and that "therefore 
plaintiff's counsel will not suffer prejudice if fees are not 
paid immediately." App. at 20. 
 
There can be no dispute that Lanni will at some point be 
able to execute on the fee judgment and receive interest 
from the date a judgment was entered quantifying the 
award of fees and cost. See Eaves v. County of Cape May, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The writ also sought satisfaction of the merits judgment, which was 
being processed at the time by the New Jersey Treasury and had been 
partially paid. The full merits judgment was paid in full by the State 
Treasurer on April 17, 2000. 
 
4. On June 1, 2000, Ms. Wong filed a certification representing that 
Lanni had discharged her firm on May 31, 2000. Subsequently, it was 
represented to the Court that Lanni and his counsel had resolved their 
dispute. 
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239 F.3d 527, 542 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover, he currently 
has security for the payment of that judgment in the form 
of a cash deposit with the Clerk of the District Court. He 
insists, however, that he is entitled to immediate 
disbursement of those funds to him. Appellees respond that 
comity gave the District Court discretion to stay execution 
on the judgment, and it did not abuse its discretion by 
doing so. 
 
We find no record support for the proposition that the 
District Court's decision to quash the writ of execution was 
based on considerations of comity. Moreover, we agree with 
Lanni that the fact that a judgment will earn collectible 
interest is not alone a sufficient basis for quashing a writ 
of execution. At the same time, we recognize that Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 69(a) makes the issuance of a writ of execution 
discretionary, and we acknowledge that there may be some 
circumstances in which considerations of comity will 
warrant the exercise of that discretion in favor of a state 
defendant. 
 
Our mandate will reverse the judgment of the District 
Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. Execution during the brief period before a new 
judgment is entered would therefore be inappropriate. If 
Lanni and his counsel are unwilling to wait until the end of 
that period, however, they are free to move for 
disbursement of the funds held by the Court. If the District 
Court believes that comity counsels against granting that 
relief, it should explain its view of the matter. 5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note that the parties did not call to our attention or to the 
attention of the District Court a circuit split on the issue of whether an 
appeal by a judgment holder automatically stays the judgment. Compare 
TVA v. Atlas Machine, 803 F.2d 794, 797 (4th Cir. 1986) (an appeal by 
the prevailing party operates as a stay of execution), with Trustmark Ins. 
Co. v. Galluci, 193 F.3d 558, 559 (1st Cir. 1999) (an appeal by the 
prevailing party does not operate as a stay of execution unless there is 
inconsistency between the appeal and execution on the judgment); BASF 
Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., 979 F.2d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); 
Enserch Corporation v. Shand Morahand Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 462, 464 & 
n.3 (5th Cir. 1990) (same). Because this appeal is now terminated, this 
issue is moot and we express no opinion thereon. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
We will vacate the District Court's award of attorney's 
fees and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                14 
